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INTRODUCTION
In the last several years, the concept of salience, which originated in
cognitive psychology literature and made its way into behavioral economics,
has been mentioned in almost every conceivable field of study. Salience refers
to the prominence of an item: the more salient something is, the more aware
individuals are of its effect. Budget-conscious shoppers are advised to pay
with cash because it makes their purchases more salient to them;1 stores have

∗ Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. For comments on
previous drafts, I am grateful to John R. Brooks II, Alan Feld, David Gamage, Daniel
Halperin, Benjamin Leff, Stephanie McMahon, Eloise Pasachoff, Diane Ring, Theodore
Sims, Matthew Stephenson, David Walker, Alvin Warren, and Diana Winters, as well as the
participants in the Boston University School of Law Faculty Workshop and the Sixth
Annual Junior Tax Scholars Workshop at University of California – Irvine. Thanks to Greg
N. Corbin, Ashley Mahoney, Brandon J. Owens, and Sapna N. Patel for excellent research
assistance and to Danielle Papa for administrative assistance. All errors remain my own.
1 See Donna Rosato, Life Without Plastic, MONEY, June 17, 2008, http://money
.cnn.com/2008/06/16/pf/without_plastic.moneymag/index.htm?postversion=2008061713
(reporting on a study that consumers who pay cash spend less than consumers who use
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taken to printing customer savings on receipts to make the benefits of shopping
with them more salient to those same shoppers.2 Economists have discussed
salience in a variety of areas, ranging from highway tolls that become less
salient as more drivers enroll in EZ-Pass programs3 to sales taxes that become
more salient when posted prices are rewritten to include them.4
In the area of income tax policy, salience has become an increasingly
popular topic. Starting with McCaffery in the 1990s and continuing today,
many tax scholars have discussed the prominence of specific tax provisions
and the tax system as a whole in the mind of taxpayers. Underlying these
discussions is the idea that, as a tax becomes less salient, taxpayers become
less conscious of the effect of that tax. In response, they oftentimes become
more willing to pay that tax, and there is less behavioral distortion to avoid that
particular tax.
This general introduction to low salience – or “hidden” – taxes ignores the
normative implications of taxpayers becoming more willing (or less opposed)
to pay a tax when they are less aware of it. Some commentators argue that this
lack of awareness is inherently a problem: taxpayer confusion or misguidance
is objectively wrong, and policymakers should never take advantage of this
confusion.5 Others argue that this confusion creates an opportunity for
policymakers to raise revenue for needed policies without facing the wrath of
the taxpaying citizenry.6
This Article argues that, to date, the literature has essentially ignored a
significant aspect of salience. The vast majority of articles addressing taxpayer
awareness focus on provisions that increase the tax burden of taxpayers – what
this Article refers to as “revenue-raising tax provisions.” They debate whether
or not taxes should be hidden, the implications of hidden taxes, how taxes
become hidden, and how to respond to the consequences of hidden taxes.7
What they generally do not discuss is the salience of provisions that decrease
the tax burden of taxpayers – deductions, exclusions, and credits. In the

credit or debit cards).
2 See Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price
Presentation, 10 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 189, 192 (2003).
3 Amy Finkelstein, E-Z Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 2009 Q.J. ECON. 969.
4 Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence,
99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145 (2009).
5 See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1933-37
(1994).
6 See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J.
ON REG. 253, 310 (2011).
7 See, e.g., Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009); McCaffery,
supra note 5, at 1874-1926; David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax
Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011); Schenk, supra
note 6, at 281.
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following discussion, this Article will refer to these provisions collectively as
“revenue-reducing tax provisions.”
This Article begins to fill that gap and argues that revenue-reducing tax
provisions raise new issues to consider when discussing salience. Because
deductions, exclusions, and credits are in many ways the mirror image of
revenue-raising tax provisions, taxpayer awareness of these provisions often
acts in the reverse direction of provisions that increase tax payments. While
taxpayers arguably underestimate their tax liability as provisions that increase
that liability become less salient, the opposite is true for many revenuereducing tax provisions. For taxpayers to underestimate their tax burden – or
overestimate the reduction in their tax burden – as a result of the effect of
deductions, exclusions, and credits, those tax provisions must become more
salient. Although commentators have alluded to the high salience of certain
revenue-reducing tax provisions,8 they have not discussed the market salience
of these provisions in detail. This Article expands on that aspect of salience
and discusses its implications.
As a way of explaining the salience of certain revenue-reducing tax
provisions, this Article introduces the concept of hypersalience. Hypersalience
occurs when a tax provision is fully – or almost fully – salient, but the limits
restricting that provision’s application are hidden, or less salient. When
revenue-reducing tax provisions are hypersalient, they have a similar effect to
hidden taxes: taxpayers inaccurately underestimate their tax burden and thus
possibly over-distort their behavior in order to take greater advantage of a tax
provision that does not actually provide the benefit they believe it provides.
Hypersalience thus rests on the economic equivalence of hidden taxes and
hidden limits. The effect of a restriction on a revenue-reducing tax provision
being hidden is similar to the effect of a revenue-raising tax provision itself
being hidden. Both situations lead taxpayers to perceive that they are subject
to less taxation than they in fact are.
This Article illustrates hypersalience by way of the charitable deduction.
Several factors make the charitable deduction a relevant example. First, it may
provide the most extreme version of salience of any deduction. The
deductibility of charitable donations is one of the most well-known aspects of
our tax system.9 The deduction’s extreme salience is tied to the fact that
charitable organizations, ranging from homeless shelters and museums to
symphonies and child welfare organizations, alert potential donors that
donations are tax deductible. This deduction, however, is not merely highly
salient – it is hypersalient. Such hypersalience results because the same level

8 In his reference to cognitive theory and deductions, McCaffery wrote that “the framing
effect of being able to make a ‘fully tax deductible’ gift” likely affects taxpayers’
willingness to give. McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1913.
9 Such a contention requires empirical support, and, while this Article does not provide
empirical support for the salience of the charitable deduction, it welcomes further research
in this area.
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of awareness does not extend to the limitations of the deduction; the charitable
organizations contributing to its salience do not market the fact that fewer than
half of all taxpayers can actually take this deduction. The charitable deduction
can thus be seen as a model (or a warning, depending on the reader’s
normative view of the salience of this deduction) for policymakers and
academics considering hypersalience. Second, the charitable deduction has
existed in the Internal Revenue Code since early in the Code’s history, and its
general parameters have remained fairly constant through that time. Therefore,
discussion of the charitable deduction is not hampered by its short existence or
varying provisions. Finally, the charitable deduction is unlikely to disappear in
the near future. Although all provisions of the Code are open to modification,
the majority of proposed amendments to the charitable deduction are to expand
its reach rather than to eliminate it.10
After introducing and illustrating hypersalience, this Article outlines why
the concept of hypersalience matters. By expanding the hidden tax discussion
to include the hidden limits of highly salient revenue-reducing tax provisions,
hypersalience adds several new considerations to the tax policy literature.
First, the hypersalience of the charitable deduction highlights the role that
parties other than the government can play in increasing taxpayer awareness of
certain tax provisions. Both the prominence of the charitable deduction and
the hidden nature of its limits may partly result from advertising by the
charitable organizations that are the third-party beneficiaries of the deduction.
Such third-party marketing by non-governmental actors raises concerns about
the prominence of such provisions. Second, hypersalience suggests that
models on which policymakers base their decisions may not accurately account
for taxpayer behavior. In the context of the charitable deduction, hypersalience
suggests that models of price elasticity of giving underestimate taxpayer
response to changes in tax rates and that the charitable deduction may in fact
be more treasury efficient than previously thought. Third, hypersalience
suggests that taxpayers may consume more of certain goods in response to the
mistaken belief that they will receive tax benefits as a result of such
consumption. While the “consumption” that results from the charitable
deduction – i.e., greater giving to charitable organizations – may not seem
problematic for some readers, consumption warranting more concern may

10 See, e.g., JOEL FRIEDMAN & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, CHARITABLE DEDUCTION FOR TAXPAYERS WHO DO NOT ITEMIZE: PROPOSAL
RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS AND COST (2002), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/3-21-02tax.pdf (discussing a 2002 proposal by Senators
Lieberman and Santorum to allow non-itemizers to deduct their charitable contributions up
to a limited amount). But see NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, COCHAIR’S PROPOSAL (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscal
commission.gov/files/documents/CoChair_Draft.pdf (asserting that one of three proposals to
cut the federal deficit would eliminate the deduction, while the other two would limit its
applicability).
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result from other revenue-reducing tax provisions. One such provision is the
home mortgage interest deduction, which illustrates the possibly unintended
policy consequences of hypersalience.
Although the greater treasury efficiency of certain provisions could be seen
as a positive consequence of hypersalience, this Article advocates curtailing
hypersalience in the charitable deduction and other revenue-reducing tax
provisions. This normative stance is based on the fact that hypersalience rests
on taxpayer ignorance or misunderstanding, as well as the role of private thirdparty beneficiaries and the potential increased consumption of goods that
results from this misunderstanding.
Part I of this Article introduces the concept of hypersalience with a brief
overview of relevant behavioral economics and tax policy literature. Part II
then uses the charitable deduction as an illustration of the concept. Part III
discusses the implications of hypersalience. Part IV builds on this discussion
to assess the costs and benefits of hypersalience and then presents proposals
for curtailing hypersalience. This Article concludes with a call for further
research.
I.

AN INTRODUCTION TO HYPERSALIENCE

In the last several years, behavioral economics has entered into tax policy
discussions with a vengeance. As contrasted with more traditional economic
analysis, which is posited on a rational actor optimizing her utility, behavioral
economics employs the lessons of cognitive psychology11 to consider how
actual economic actors, rather than the idealized rational actor, make decisions
and otherwise behave.12 Unlike traditional models that depend on rational
behavior,13 behavioral economics highlights that individuals often rely on
mental shortcuts, known in the literature as biases and heuristics, to make
economic decisions.14 These mental shortcuts may lead economic actors – or

11 Behavioral economics builds on cognitive psychology along with behavioral research
and probability theory. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 640 (1999).
12 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1654 (1998) (“‘[B]ehavioral’ in ‘behavioral law and economics’ is
about infusing law and economics with insights into actual (rather than hypothesized)
human behavior.”); McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1868-69 (referring to expected utility theory
as the “chief foil for cognitive theory”).
13 Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 106, 108 (2006) (stating that cognitive psychology “has shown that individuals
deviate, often systematically, from ideal precepts of rationality, including consistency”).
14 Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA.
TAX REV. 1, 23 (2010); McCaffery & Baron, supra note 13, at 109 (defining
“overgeneralized heuristics” to “include extensions of principles that serve good purposes
most of the time to inappropriate situations” and “judgment biases” to include “a class of
general distortions of numerical judgment”). Among the many cognitive shortcuts used by
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at least boundedly rational actors15 – to act illogically or against their interests
instead of rationally maximizing their own economic utility.16
One fundamental aspect of behavioral economics that has garnered attention
in the area of tax is the concept of salience. As McCaffery and Baron stated in
2006, “[S]ubjects focus on one especially salient aspect of a choice or
evaluation problem and ignore or fail to integrate other less salient items.
They make decisions in isolation, as if with blinders on, of logically relevant
data.”17 In other words, the aggregate effect of various biases and heuristics is
that individuals generally focus on what is most salient, ignoring other relevant
information and acting on each decision essentially in isolation.
Salience, also sometimes referred to as prominence or vividness,18 generally
refers to individuals’ practices of placing greater importance on “highly visible
or easily recallable events or facts.”19 In terms of tax policy, salience generally
refers to a tax provision itself being prominent. If a tax is salient, taxpayers are
fully aware of the cost of the tax to them. If a tax is less salient, taxpayers are
less aware of its impact.
Much of the literature on salience considers all types of salience under the
same rubric.20 Two recent additions to the literature, however, have
highlighted that this approach is misleading and that salience in fact has two

individuals in making economic decisions are the availability heuristic, the anchoring effect,
framing, and loss aversion. For more of an introduction to behavioral economics and
cognitive theory, see McCaffery, supra note 5; for discussions of a wide variety of biases
and heuristics, see Hanson & Kysar, supra note 11, at 643-87.
15 Note that the concept of rational actors is not entirely rejected by behavioral
economics. Instead, many authors have focused on how the actions of boundedly rational
actors differ from fully rational actors, who may still exist in the economic sphere. See, e.g.,
Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1211, 1247-50 (2003) (proposing policies
that affect boundedly rational actors and fully rational actors differently); Jolls, supra note
12, at 1676-81 (describing the difference between boundedly rational actors and fully
rational actors); cf. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 11, at 633 (stating that these “cognitive
illusions . . . are not limited to the uneducated or unintelligent. . . . Instead, they affect us all
with uncanny consistency and unflappable persistence.”).
16 Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Tax Policy in an Era of Rising Inequality:
The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2005) (stating
that behavioral economics “has long demonstrated that people do not always perceive
economic and other matters in a logically consistent fashion”); Camerer, supra note 15, at
107 (“[A] large part of behavioral economics describes ways people sometimes fail to
behave in their own best interests.”).
17 McCaffery & Baron, supra note 13, at 109 (citations omitted).
18 McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1886.
19 Id. at 1886-87.
20 See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 7, at 24, 54 (asserting that “there are multiple
dimensions to tax salience” but also mentioning that “many commentators – in particular
tax-legal scholars – persist in viewing tax salience primarily as a unitary concept”).
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components: (1) market – or economic – salience and (2) political salience.21
Under the division proposed by Gamage and Shanske, market salience
addresses “how tax presentation affects market decisions and economic
activity,”22 while political salience addresses “how tax presentation affects
voting behavior and political outcomes.”23 Schenk similarly proposes that
there are two types of behavioral responses to salience. The first, which
responds to what she refers to as economic salience, is “a change in economic
decisionmaking.”24 The second, which responds to what she refers to as
political salience, is “a political response to government action.”25 This Article
focuses entirely on market, or economic, salience. In other words, all
arguments about the salience of revenue-reducing tax provisions in this Article
are focused purely on how taxpayers respond in the market to the prominence
of these tax provisions; this Article does not address how the prominence of
the provisions affects the voting behavior of taxpayers.
Many articles on tax salience build off of McCaffery’s 1994 article in which
he proposed applying cognitive psychology to taxation.26 The general
takeaway from this literature is that salience, in the words of McCaffery, helps
to explain “why citizens fail to notice, or otherwise under-react to, certain
types of taxes and tax changes.”27 As these articles explain, some taxes are
salient – but some are less so. The latter taxes are referred to as hidden taxes.
Much of the literature on the salience of the tax system has focused on those
taxes that are particularly hidden or that have low salience. One of the major
consequences of a tax being hidden is that it does not create the same
behavioral distortions that would be expected of the same tax were it fully
salient.
As many have noted, taxes are associated with inefficiency and deadweight
loss in that they induce behavioral distortions in taxpayers trying to avoid or
minimize tax payments.28 If a taxpayer is unaware of the effect – or at least of
the full effect – of a tax, that taxpayer is less likely to change her behavior to
the full extent required to avoid the tax.29

21

See generally id.; Schenk, supra note 6, at 272.
Gamage & Shanske, supra note 7, at 20.
23 Id.
24 Schenk, supra note 6, at 272.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Galle, supra note 7; David Gamage & Darien Shanske, supra note 7; Susan
Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
483 (2009). See generally McCaffery, supra note 5.
27 Id. at 1887.
28 See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable
Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 3 (2012)
(explaining that all behavioral responses to income tax rate changes represent some form of
inefficiency).
29 See Schenk, supra note 6, at 263 (“A salient tax (or tax provision) is predicted to affect
22
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The literature varies in its views of hidden taxes. Some commentators argue
that these taxes are more efficient than less hidden taxes30 because they lead to
fewer behavioral distortions than do fully salient taxes.31 Other commentators
argue that this efficiency is itself problematic because taxpayers are not as
aware of the taxes being imposed on them.32 Another group argues that
perhaps the reduced salience of hidden taxes is a positive development.33 And
still a fourth group of commentators argues that we do not understand enough
about certain types of salience to know whether or not hidden taxes are a
positive or a negative development.34 Some recent commentators have
charged that the very term “hidden taxes” encapsulates a normative judgment
and should thus be avoided.35 Since this Article focuses on the opposite of
hidden taxes, it uses that term only to highlight the fact that prior discussions
of low-salience taxes focused on the extent to which taxpayers underestimate
their effect.
A more recent addition to the literature on tax salience is made up of
empirical studies determining the actual salience of specific tax provisions.36
One empirical study focused on the salience of highway tolls before and after
the widespread adoption of electronic toll collection technology.37 In terms of
market salience, drivers were hypothesized to be less aware of the actual cost
of highway travel after the adoption of electronic toll collection technology;
after drivers had adopted an EZ-Pass or similar system, the cost of tolls
appears to have become less salient than it had been when they had to search
for exact change.38
taxpayer behavior; conversely, a low-salience tax (or provision) predictably would change
behavior less or not at all. If taxpayers are unaware of the tax or provision, then they cannot
respond to it; if the tax or provision is not prominent, they will under-react.”).
30 Galle, supra note 7, at 62.
31 Id. at 77-78.
32 McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1943.
33 Gamage & Shanske, supra note 7, at 21 (arguing “for a general presumption in favor
of reducing market salience”); Schenk, supra note 6, at 281 (stating that “[t]he consensus [of
other articles] is that legislators should not take advantage of cognitive biases in designing
taxes” but asserting “that there are circumstances where it is appropriate for legislators to do
so”).
34 Gamage & Shanske, supra note 7, at 21 (highlighting lack of knowledge of the effects
of political salience); Galle, supra note 7, at 112 (“It remains theoretically uncertain whether
hidden taxes can increase welfare.”).
35 See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 7, at 24 (avoiding the term and calling it “emotion
laden” and “potentially misleading”); Schenk, supra note 6, at 262-63 (stating that “‘hidden
tax’ is a misnomer”).
36 While the articles cited here are not the only empirical studies of salience, they are the
ones that have been most often discussed in the income tax literature.
37 Finkelstein, supra note 3.
38 Id. at 972 (“I present survey evidence . . . that is consistent with the assumption that
[electronic toll collection] reduces the salience of tolls.”).
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Another study of the salience of specific taxes or analogous fees involved
changing the posted prices in a store such that they included the sales tax.39
Although consumers were aware of the sales tax that applied to their purchases
when asked,40 the increased salience of the sales tax when consumers did not
have to calculate it themselves led to distorted behavior.41 In other words,
consumers bought less when the price explicitly included sales taxes.42 The
study’s authors interpreted this to mean that consumers also underreacted when
the sales tax was less salient43 and concluded that “salience matters:
individuals know about taxes when their attention is drawn to the subject, but
do not pay attention to taxes that are not transparent while deciding what to
buy.”44
The above articles focused primarily on the salience of revenue-raising tax
provisions and on how taxpayer behavior changes when taxes become more or
less hidden. While some articles have looked at the other side of the coin and
considered the salience of revenue-reducing tax provisions, the majority of
these articles focused on the political salience of such provisions rather than
their market salience.45 Likewise, while some commentators have mentioned
the market salience of tax expenditures in passing, few have delved into this
issue in detail.46 A recent addition to this area is an article based on survey

39

Chetty, supra note 4.
Id. at 1165 (“[M]ost consumers are well informed about commodity tax rates when
their attention is drawn to the subject.”).
41 Id. at 1154.
42 Id.
43 See id. at 1165.
44 Id. (emphasis omitted).
45 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare Benefits,
40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 264 (2009) (“[T]he hidden nature of tax expenditures . . . makes it
easier to enact, and maintain, policies that might not weather scrutiny if enacted as direct
spending programs.”); David Gamage, Professor, U.C. Berkley Sch. of Law, Tax Salience
and Tax Expenditures (Jan. 14, 2011) (a copy of the PowerPoint presentation accompanying
Professor Gamage’s speech at the Loyola Law School Los Angeles Conference, Starving
the Beast, is available at http://events.lls.edu/taxpolicy/documents/PANEL1GAMAGE
taxsalienceandtaxexpendituresfinal01-11-11.pdf); Deborah H. Schenk, Professor, N.Y.U.
Sch. of Law, The Salience of Tax Expenditures and Implications for Reform (Jan. 14, 2011)
(a copy of the PowerPoint presentation accompanying Professor Schenk’s speech at the
Loyola Law School Los Angeles Conference, Starving the Beast, is available at
http://events.lls.edu/taxpolicy/documents/PANEL1SCHENKpowerpointfinal01-05-11.pdf).
These sources focus specifically on tax expenditures. The term “tax expenditures” refers to
tax provisions that allow taxpayers not to pay taxes that normally would be due. JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 2 (2008).
46 Edward McCaffery is the author who has mentioned this the most, particularly in his
earlier work introducing tax scholars to cognitive theory. He has suggested that taxpayers
are overly aware of the tax benefits for home ownership. McCaffery, supra note 6, at 192023. He also posited that taxpayers overvalue the charitable deduction. Id. at 1906
40
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data suggesting that certain revenue-reducing tax provisions, such as the
charitable deduction, are not highly salient.47 Although this study adds
valuable empirical data to the salience discussion, it focuses only on taxpayers
who are aware of their itemization status. Accordingly, it does not reach many
of the taxpayers who are the focus of this Article.48
As summarized above, the existing tax salience literature focuses primarily
on revenue-raising provisions and on the distinction between fully-salient taxes
and hidden taxes. The salience literature has thus not fully addressed a
fundamental concept: hypersalience.
An assumption shared by many earlier articles is that, generally, taxes are
either fully salient or less than salient. If a tax is fully salient, a taxpayer is
fully cognizant of how that tax will affect her. If the salient item at issue is a
revenue-raising tax provision – i.e., it is a requirement for the taxpayer to pay a
certain amount – a fully salient provision means that a taxpayer fully
understands how much she owes. So if this provision requires the taxpayer to
pay $1000 when she engages in a certain activity, she will expect to be $1000
poorer if she engages in that activity. In comparison, if a tax is less than fully
salient, a taxpayer is less aware – if aware at all – of how that tax will affect
her. The general thrust of the literature is that a less salient – or hidden – tax is
one where the taxpayer thinks she is going to pay less in tax than she actually
will pay. Taxpayers underestimate their tax burden under hidden taxes. If the
aforementioned $1000 tax were less than fully salient, the taxpayer would
expect to pay less than $1000 if she engages in the activity. To summarize the
literature very broadly, a fully salient tax means that a taxpayer correctly
predicts the amount that she will owe in taxes. A less salient tax means that a
taxpayer incorrectly predicts that she will pay less than the actual amount that
she will eventually owe.
The discussions found in earlier articles ignore the full spectrum of salience.
An aspect of taxation that has heretofore not been discussed in detail is that it
is possible for taxpayers to overestimate how a part of the tax system will
affect them. In fact, to achieve the same result as is achieved by hidden taxes,
(predicting that individuals will generally “overvalue nontaxable benefits [and] overestimate
the tax deductible component of charitable gifts”); see also id. at 1911 (“The idea is that the
tax deductibility of each is an added feature of its attractiveness, such that many taxpayers
will over-adjust, or otherwise fail to be precise, in taking account of the relevance of the
deduction.”).
47 See Jacob Goldin & Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Salience (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author).
48 See id. (“Respondents who answered that they did not know their filing status were
excluded from the analysis.”). Although Goldin and Listokin find that many taxpayers
underestimate the impact of revenue-reducing tax provisions, this finding does not address
the concept of hypersalience directly in that the taxpayers who wrongly underestimate the
effect of such provisions are those who also claim to itemize. Furthermore, Goldin and
Listokin also find that a number of taxpayers who do not itemize believe they get a benefit
from revenue-reducing tax provisions, which itself is evidence of hypersalience. See id.
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a provision that reduces a taxpayer’s tax liability must be overestimated.49
Consider again the $1000 tax provision that will apply if the taxpayer engages
in an activity. If that is a revenue-raising tax provision, the only way for a
taxpayer to mistakenly believe that she will owe less than $1000 if she engages
in the activity is to underestimate the tax. If the $1000 is instead a deduction,
credit, or exclusion, the calculation is reversed. For the taxpayer to again
mistakenly believe that she will owe less on her taxes, she must overestimate
the effect of that provision. She must believe either that the revenue-reducing
tax provision will apply to her when it will not or that it will apply to a greater
degree than it in fact will. In other words, the provision must be more than
merely not hidden and more than fully salient: it must be hypersalient.
Hypersalience is thus the phenomenon by which the prominence of a tax
provision leads taxpayers to overestimate its incidence. Depending on how
one defines salience, hypersalience can be broken out into two separate parts:
for a revenue-reducing tax provision to be hypersalient, the provision itself
must be close to fully salient and its limitations or exclusions must be less
salient. Some readers may conceive of hypersalience as the combination of a
highly salient provision and low-salience limitations. Others may conceive of
it as a situation in which salience and accuracy are mutually exclusive. Still
others may conceive of hypersalience as the combination of salient benefits
and complex limitations.50 Regardless of how it is understood, hypersalience
results in the tax benefits of a tax provision being overvalued because the
restrictions on those benefits are themselves undervalued. Rather than a tax
itself being hidden, as is the case with low-salience, revenue-raising
provisions, the limitations are the hidden element in hypersalient revenuereducing provisions.
Hypersalience thus refers to the quality of being overly – and erroneously –
prominent. While a revenue-raising tax provision can potentially be
hypersalient – it is possible that certain tax provisions highlighted by anti-tax
protesters fit this bill51 – this Article focuses on the hypersalience of revenuereducing tax provisions. The hypersalience of such provisions is in many ways
the opposite side of the hidden tax coin. Therefore, if hidden taxes lead
taxpayers to feel the burdens of the Internal Revenue Code less acutely, then
hypersalient deductions, exemptions, and credits lead taxpayers to believe that
they are ultimately paying less in taxes than they actually are.
Hypersalience requires that the restrictions or limits on revenue-reducing tax
provisions be hidden. Since revenue-reducing tax provisions can be thought of
in economic terms as subsidies, limits on these subsidies are the economic
equivalent of revenue-raising tax provisions. Hypersalience is not, however,
49

Some commentators have alluded to the need for tax incentives, at a minimum, to be
more salient than taxes themselves. See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 6, at 276 n.101.
50 See id. at 261 (discussing the difference between salience and complexity).
51 Examples may include the estate tax and the difference between certain preferential
rates – such as the current rate on capital gains – and ordinary rates.
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just a term for hidden limits. Instead, it refers to the combination of a highly
salient tax provision and a complicated, misunderstood, or low salience set of
restrictions. Because this term encompasses both the prominence of the
revenue-reducing tax provision itself and taxpayer awareness of the limits that
apply to that provision, hypersalience touches on accuracy and awareness as
well as pure salience.
II.

THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION: A HIGH SALIENCE TAX PROVISION WITH
LOW SALIENCE LIMITATIONS

The previous discussion outlined the general contours of hypersalience.
This Part fills those contours with an example familiar to many readers. The
charitable deduction, currently provided in section 170 of the Internal Revenue
Code, allows taxpayers to deduct from gross income their contributions to
certain tax-exempt organizations.52 The charitable deduction, as with many
deductions, is a tax expenditure; the government foregoes revenue that it
otherwise would have raised through taxes, with this foregone revenue directed
toward non-profit institutions chosen by individual taxpayers.53 As highlighted
by many commentators, starting with Surrey, the effect of this deduction is that
it is an upside-down subsidy: the higher a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, the
more benefit the taxpayer receives from the charitable deduction.54 While a
taxpayer with a 10% rate pays $0.90 after taxes for a $1.00 donation, a
taxpayer with a 35% rate only pays $0.65 after taxes for the same $1.00
donation.
The charitable deduction was first enacted in 1917,55 and it has been an
accepted part of the Internal Revenue Code ever since.56 For a tax donation to
be deductible, it must be made to a church, a cemetery company, a veterans’
organization, certain small nonprofits, or an organization defined in

52

I.R.C. § 170(c) (2006). This Article also does not address tax treatments of charitable
contributions outside of the income tax, such as the estate tax or excise taxes.
53 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 45, at 2.
54 STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 134-36 (1973).
55 War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). When the charitable
deduction was first enacted, very few households were required to file tax returns. CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF ALLOWING NONITEMIZERS TO DEDUCT CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS 3 (2002) (stating that “only about 5 percent of households had to file tax
returns” in 1917). The charitable deduction for corporations was not enacted until 1935.
Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(r), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016 (1935) (extending charitable
deductions to corporations and allowing corporate taxpayers to deduct up to five percent of
their net income).
56 See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV.
531, 533 (2006) (stating that the deduction, “despite facing repeated attacks in Congress and
the media, has only been strengthened over time”).
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501(c)(3).57 Under 501(c)(3), organizations whose donors are eligible for the
deduction range from homeless shelters, animal rescue leagues, and veterans’
organizations to libraries, schools, and art museums.58 Donations to other
organizations, even those that are nonprofit and tax-exempt, are not
deductible.59
Although some donors likely give to charitable organizations solely out of
altruism, studies suggest that many donors take account of the deduction when
deciding to give. Andreoni, for one, found that impure altruism, wherein
individuals donate for multiple reasons, is a more likely model than pure
altruism and that subsidies are thus justified on these grounds.60 Studies on the
price elasticity of giving – i.e., how responsive donations are to the tax rate at
which the deduction is granted – also support the idea that the charitable
deduction increases the rate of giving. If the existence of the deduction did not
change individuals’ giving, then the price elasticity of giving would be zero – a
change in the price of a donation from, say, $0.65 per dollar of giving to $1.00
per dollar of giving61 would make no change in the amount of money an
individual donated. Although studies of the price elasticity of giving vary in
their findings, they generally find an elasticity above zero – and sometimes
even above one, suggesting that individuals are so responsive to changes in the
price of giving that they increase their donations by more than they save as the
rate changes.62

57

James R. Hines, Jr., Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit Status:
A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1186 (2010). Section 501(c)(3) lists
organizations “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary or education purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition . . . , or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
58 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
Much has been written about what organizations should be
included in this group; this Article does not enter into that debate. For more on that debate,
see, for example, ROB REICH ET AL., STANFORD UNIV. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & CIVIL
SOC’Y, ANYTHING GOES: APPROVAL OF NONPROFIT STATUS BY THE IRS (2009).
59 See Hines, supra note 57, at 1186 (providing 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations
and 501(c)(6) chambers of commerce as examples of organizations that may not receive taxdeductible donations). Donations to these latter organizations may, however, be deductible
as business expenses depending on the donor. Id.
60 See generally James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A
Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464-77 (1990).
61 This is essentially the price change that would occur if a taxpayer with a marginal rate
of 35% were no longer able to deduct charitable contributions.
62 See, e.g., Gerald Auten et al., The Distribution of Charitable Giving, Income and
Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 371, 380-81 (2002) (finding price
elasticity of giving of between -0.79 and -1.26 for persistent changes in tax prices); William
C. Randolph, Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable
Contributions, 103 J. POL. ECON. 709, 724 (1995) (finding a weighted price elasticity of
giving of between -0.51 and -1.55, depending on whether the price change was permanent
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The charitable deduction is likely one of the most salient revenue-reducing
tax provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. Such a statement ultimately
requires empirical research for support, and this Article welcomes such future
analysis of the deduction’s salience. Even without such empirical support,
however, a variety of statements by other commentators support the idea that
the charitable deduction is particularly salient. From conversations at family
dinner tables to blog posts to newspaper articles and Miss Manners columns,63
discussions of the charitable deduction abound. Furthermore, as anyone who
has ever turned on a radio station during a fund drive, received a solicitation
from an animal rescue league or art museum in the mail, heard a jingle about
donating their car, or considered giving online to a charitable organization can
attest, the salience of the deductibility of charitable donations is high.
The information that is most prominent about charitable donations is that
they are, in the words of many of the organizations that receive them, “fully
tax deductible.”64 If such a contention were true, and all donors were able to
reduce their taxes as a result of any and all charitable contributions, then the
charitable deduction would merely be highly salient. The organizations’
contentions, however, are not true, and that is what transforms the charitable
deduction from a prominent to a hypersalient tax provision.
Despite what many taxpayers may believe, all donors cannot deduct all
donations made to charitable organizations. The charitable deduction is
limited in several different ways, all of which undermine the common belief
that donations are fully tax-deductible. Although the deduction is restricted by
numerous limits that apply to specific donors or types of donations,65 this

or transitory).
63 See, e.g., Chris Farrell, Well-informed Giving Should Be Part of Any Sound Financial
Plan, STAR TRIBUNE, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.startribune.com/business/yourmoney/
79675787.html?page=all&prepage=2&c=y#continue (stating without limit that “Uncle Sam
gives you a tax benefit for your charitable giving”); Judith Martin, Charitable Gifts Miss the
Point, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 21, 2010, http://www.chicagotribune.com/features/tribu/scfam-1221-manners-20101221,0,6320159.story (displaying the manner in which both the
advice columnist and her Gentle Reader assume that a taxpayer receives a tax deduction for
a charitable donation); Janet Morrissey, Donate – and Deduct!, TIME, Nov. 2, 2009,
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1933436_1933428_1933418,0
0.html (advising readers to “bump up the giving and watch your 2009 tax bill shrink”).
64 See infra Part III.A.
65 These limits include the section 170(b) limit on the percentage of income that
taxpayers can donate and the section 68 phase-out of the deduction. I.R.C. § 170(b) (2006);
I.R.C. § 68 (2006). Under section 170(b)(1), individuals are limited to deducting either fifty
or thirty percent of their adjusted gross income in charitable donations, depending on the
form and recipient of those donations. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1). Until January 1, 2010, section 68
provided a further restriction in that taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes over a set
amount were required to reduce their itemized deductions by the lesser of three percent of
excess adjusted gross income or eighty percent of itemized deductions. I.R.C. § 68(c).
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Article focuses on just one restriction that serves to limit the deduction’s
applicability to fewer than 50% of taxpayers.66 The charitable deduction, as
with many other deductions, is only available to those taxpayers who itemize
their deductions.67 If a taxpayer’s donations total less than the standard
deduction, the taxpayer, regardless of whether she has donated to charitable
organizations, may not take advantage of any itemized deductions – including
the charitable deduction.68 The deductibility of a charitable donation can
therefore be seen as dependent on a taxpayer’s other deductions. If, for
example, a taxpayer makes significant interest payments on a home mortgage
and lives in a state with high income taxes and a city with high property and
income taxes, then that taxpayer may be more likely to be able to deduct her
charitable donations. If that same taxpayer made the exact same amount of
donations but rented an apartment and lived in a state and city with low or no
deductible state or local taxes, then that taxpayer would be less likely to be
able to deduct those same charitable deductions.
This Article is not arguing that all taxpayers, whether or not they itemize,
should be permitted to take the charitable deduction,69 nor is it arguing for the
abolition or modification of the standard deduction.70 One of the purposes of
66

This Article does not engage with the fact that some taxpayers may mistakenly believe
that a deduction is a dollar-for-dollar credit, and not a reduction of taxable income. Such a
misunderstanding, however, is yet another contributing factor to the hypersalience of this
and other deductions.
67 See I.R.C. §§ 161-224 (2006).
An itemization requirement has attached to the
charitable deduction since the deduction was first created. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 55, at 3 (stating that “taxpayers had to itemize their allowable expenditures” to
claim the deduction in 1917). The standard deduction did not exist until 1944. See id. The
effects of itemization have been discussed in a host of contexts, including the distortion
created between the price for itemizers and non-itemizers. See Charles T. Clotfelter, TaxInduced Distortions in the Voluntary Sector, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 671 (1989).
68 If the taxpayer does itemize her deductions and they are less than the standard
deduction, expectations about both economic self-interest and IRS recalculations of
overpayment will lead her to take the standard deduction.
69 This argument has been made many times, with varying success, in the context of the
charitable deduction. From 1982 through 1985, non-itemizers could partially deduct their
charitable donations. In 1986, they could fully deduct their donations. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 55, at 3; Friedman & Greenstein, supra note 10, at 7.
70 Charitable organizations themselves raised such an argument when the standard
deduction was first proposed in 1944. See Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the
Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 850 (2001). One response to such
an argument is that the standard deduction’s purpose is to prevent taxpayers from itemizing
the first dollar of income, instead only providing a subsidy once taxpayers have donated a
significant amount. See David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions:
Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 238
(2009). The deduction’s current structure raises questions about the effectiveness of the
standard deduction at achieving this purpose. Such concerns arise because, in reality, a
taxpayer’s choice to itemize is largely attributable to other deductions – such as the home
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the standard deduction is to stand in for itemized deductions and create
administrative simplicity for those taxpayers who do not have enough
deductions to itemize.71 This Article does argue that, because the charitable
deduction is currently limited to those taxpayers who itemize, its salience to all
taxpayers may be misleading. Even though the number of taxpayers who
itemize has been growing in recent years,72 the majority of Americans still take
the standard deduction. In tax year 2008, 48.2 million tax returns itemized
deductions, while 91.8 million took the standard deduction, and 3.9 million
were subject to the alternative minimum tax.73 Of the approximately 143
million income tax returns filed, approximately one-third itemized their
In other words, two-thirds of returns did not itemize
deductions.74
deductions.75
This means that the vast majority of taxpayers were not able to take the
charitable deduction. Even though itemizers are the only taxpayers who may
make use of the charitable deduction, subject to the other limits that apply, they
are not the only taxpayers who make charitable contributions. Certainly, for
those 48 million taxpayers who itemize, the charitable deduction is one of the
largest itemized deductions, behind only the deductions for interest (including
home mortgage interest) and for taxes paid to states and localities.76 In 2008,
approximately 39 million taxpayers itemized their charitable contributions,
According to the charitable
claiming $173 billion in deductions.77
organizations who received them, however, the donations in that same year
amounted to significantly more than $173 billion. In 2008, charitable

mortgage interest deduction and the state and local tax deduction – than to the number of
donations a taxpayer makes. See id.
71 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 55, at 1 (“In principle, taxpayers who claim the
standard deduction already receive recognition for their charitable contributions under
current tax law.”); John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction and the
Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 203, 205 (2011)
(arguing that the standard deduction’s two purposes are to provide for a minimum amount of
untaxed income and to provide a simple alternative to itemized deductions).
72 ERIC J. TODER & CAROL ROSENBERG, TAX POL’Y CTR., THE SHARE OF TAXPAYERS WHO
ITEMIZE IS GROWING 695 (2007) (“Between 1995 and 2004, the share of itemizers increased
from 29 percent to 35 percent, increasing every year except 2003 . . . .”).
73 JUSTIN BRYAN, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 2008,
at 9-10 (2010). For more on the alternative minimum tax, see infra notes 158-165 and
accompanying text.
74 BRYAN, supra note 73, at 6-9. These statistics focus on returns rather than individual
taxpayers.
75 Id.
76 Id. (stating that approximately forty-eight million Americans took a deduction for
$467 billion in taxes paid; approximately thirty-nine million Americans took a deduction for
$498 billion in interest paid; and approximately thirty-nine million Americans took a
deduction for $173 billion in charitable contributions).
77 Id.
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organizations reported receiving $229 billion in donations.78 The difference
between these two numbers reveals that $56 billion of donations were not
claimed as deductible contributions.79 Regardless of whether these donations
were made by taxpayers who took the standard deduction or by taxpayers who
itemized their deductions but failed to account for these donations, that number
reveals that approximately a quarter of all charitable donations, in terms of
value, are made by taxpayers who do not use those donations to benefit from
the charitable deduction.
This suggests that, for at least some of the donors who made the $56 billion
of donations that did not result in reduced tax liability, the charitable deduction
is hypersalient. While such a contention requires empirical support, this
Article presents the charitable deduction as a likely example of hypersalience –
and hypersalience as a possible explanation for some of the $56 billion
donation-deduction gap. Presenting the charitable deduction as an illustration
of hypersalience may lead readers to raise certain criticisms of this concept.
This Article seeks to address and allay those concerns. Criticisms of
hypersalience can be broken into three categories: debiasing, prevalence, and
relevance. This section addresses the first two categories in turn. The next
section tackles the question of relevance.
Critics of hypersalience who point to debiasing would suggest that, even if
some donors are not aware that they will only get the benefit of the charitable
deduction if they itemize, such donors will only make this error once.80 In
other words, they will educate – or debias – themselves sufficiently to
overcome the hypersalience of the charitable deduction after one year of losing
out on its benefits. This critique suggests that perhaps taxpayers fall into this
trap once – the first time they pay their taxes – and then, once they realize the
difference between itemizing and taking the standard deduction, they never
again mistakenly believe that they will receive a tax benefit such as the
charitable deduction.

78 GIVING U.S.A., U.S. CHARITABLE GIVING ESTIMATED TO BE $307.65 BILLION IN 2008,
at 3 (2009), available at http://www.givingusa.org/press_releases/gusa/GivingReaches300
billion.pdf.
79 The actual difference between $229.28 billion and $172.94 billion is $56.34 billion.
This number is significantly different from the estimate that the Joint Committee on
Taxation made in 2002 that claimed that non-itemizers in recent years had contributed over
$20 billion per year. See Friedman & Greenstein, supra note 10, at 1. There are several
possible reasons for this difference. First, it is possible that the $229.28 billion number is
skewed higher due to reporting by charitable organizations. Even if this is the case, and the
difference is closer to the JCT’s estimate of over $20 billion, this latter number is still
significant. Second, it is possible that the difference has grown since 2002 due to the focus
on “compassionate conservatism,” increased giving to religious organizations, and/or
increased giving due to economic concerns.
80 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, De-biasing Through Law (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11738, 2005).
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This is an appealing idea, and much has been written about taxpayer literacy
and education,81 but it seems doubtful that individuals can teach themselves
sufficiently to offset any concerns about hypersalience.
First, some
commentators have argued that taxpayers adopt a “learned helplessness”
toward the tax law: some taxpayers essentially give up on teaching themselves
in the face of the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code.82 If this is true,
taxpayers who have adopted this helpless attitude are unlikely to break out of
that attitude solely to educate themselves as to when the tax provision will
apply.
A second argument against the idea that taxpayers will learn not to
overestimate the benefits accruing from a provision rests on the increasing
number of taxpayers who rely on outside preparers and computer programs to
file their taxes. Perhaps the twenty percent of taxpayers who do their own
taxes83 are less likely to perceive provisions such as the charitable deduction as
hypersalient. For the remaining eighty percent of taxpayers, however, it seems
far less likely that they will internalize the lessons about the limits of such
provisions. In the context of the charitable deduction, while those taxpayers
who use computer programs may notice whether or not they itemize, these
programs make the decision for them, after taxpayers have entered all their
potentially itemizable deductions.84 Taxpayers who use outside preparers are
also unlikely to decide independently whether to itemize or to take the standard
deduction. Both of these latter groups of taxpayers collect their itemizable
receipts during the course of the year and turn the data on those receipts over to
another entity, whether computer or human, to decide for them. It seems
unlikely that such an experience will “teach” taxpayers the limits on the
charitable deduction.85 Another way of framing this contention is to point out

81

See, e.g., Galle, supra note 7, at 89-93; Schenk, supra note 6, at 294-95 (questioning
whether debiasing actually occurs in the context of low-salience taxes).
82 McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1925 (“[A] good many individuals have learned to be
helpless vis-à-vis the tax system; that is, they have given up altogether the formidable task
of understanding the law, even as it applies to them.”).
83 Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax
Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 751 (2009).
84 See,
e.g., Tax-Deduction Wisdom – Should You Itemize?, TURBOTAX,
http://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tools/tax-tips/Tax-Deductions-and-Credits/Tax-DeductionWisdom---Should-You-Itemize-/INF12061.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (“TurboTax
can help you decide whether you should itemize your deductions. Simply enter all of your
information when prompted, and let the program determine if it’s better for you to itemize
or take the standard deduction.”).
85 See also Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM.
J. TAX L. 91 (2010) (suggesting that greater computerization of tax return filing has turned
tax into a “black box” for taxpayers because it has allowed Congress to pass increasingly
complex legislation). One could argue that these taxpayers are in fact more likely to selfeducate because some data from tax year 2000 suggests, somewhat counterintuitively, that
taxpayers who use software and taxpayers who hire paid preparers spend more time on
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that taxpayers are more likely to self-educate when they experience an event;86
if they do not directly experience the act of preparing their taxes and are
instead told that they took the standard deduction, it is less likely that they will
internalize any lessons about the effect of the standard deduction.
A third argument against taxpayer self-education lies in the complicated
nature of the limits on provisions such as the charitable deduction. Even if a
taxpayer does learn in Year 1 that she was not able to take a charitable
deduction because she had not itemized enough other deductions, it is unclear
how this lesson will affect her in the following years. Will this information
prepare her for the fact that she may be able to itemize in Year 2? What if she
moves in and out of the itemization umbrella over the years, as is likely to
happen as taxpayers move, marry or divorce, add or lose dependents, buy or
sell homes, or otherwise face the changing circumstances that life brings with
it? In short, the complexities of the limits on the charitable deduction – as well
as many other provisions in the Internal Revenue Code – raise questions about
how likely it is that taxpayers will correctly self-teach. Furthermore, even if
taxpayers are fully aware of the actual statutory limits on the charitable
deduction, that is not sufficient to undo the hypersalience of the deduction.
Hypersalience arises not only from the degree of information possessed by
taxpayers but also from the prominence of the deduction when taxpayers are
making contribution decisions. Thus, even if a taxpayer is intellectually aware
of the full extent of the charitable deduction, she still may overreact to the
deduction when she donates to a charitable organization early in the year,
before she knows how many other deductions she is likely to have for the year.
This may be most true of taxpayers who are on the cusp of the standard
deduction cut-off; they may know the facts about the charitable deduction but
not be sure from year-to-year whether it will affect them.87
Self-education, therefore, appears not to be a sufficient response to
hypersalience for those readers who are concerned with the problems raised by
this concept.88 A second and related category of potential criticism of
average than those who prepare their returns by hand. See John L. Guyton et al., The Effects
of Tax Software and Paid Preparers on Compliance Costs, 58 NAT’L TAX. J. 439, 442
(2005). It seems likely, however, that this disparity in time is based more on the increased
complexity of the tax returns of the first two groups of taxpayers than it is on some other
factor. See id.
86 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 11, at 669 (discussing the finding that
individuals view experiential thinking as more compelling than “dispassionate logical
thinking”); Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation
23 (Dept. of Econ., U. of Copenhagen, Discussion Paper No. 08-21, 2008), available at
http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2008/0821.pdf/ (finding that, while
deliberation is not sufficient to de-bias people, experience “is a powerful argument to
convince others”).
87 For more on taxpayers on the cusp of the standard-deduction cut-off, see infra notes
88-91 and accompanying text.
88 For more on the difficulties of debiasing, see, for example, Norbert Schwarz et al.,
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hypersalience relates to the prevalence of this phenomenon. These types of
critiques rest on a belief that low-income taxpayers know that they will not
receive any tax benefit from deductions and high-income taxpayers are
sophisticated enough about taxation that they are aware of the limits on the
charitable deduction and unlikely to be subject to them since a higher
percentage of high-income taxpayers are itemizers.
Who, then, is
overestimating the incidence of the charitable deduction?
Even if beliefs about the responses of low-income and high-income
taxpayers to potentially hypersalient provisions are correct,89 a large swath of
taxpayers is still susceptible to hypersalience: those with incomes in the middle
of the income spectrum. In particular, the hypersalience of the charitable
deduction and other itemized deductions is most likely to affect taxpayers who
have itemized deductions with a total value that approaches the standard
deduction.90 These taxpayers may not have home mortgages or high state or
local taxes, but they may have enough itemized deductions that they take the
standard deduction in some years but itemize their deductions in other years.
What makes hypersalience prevalent is the fact that the population of itemizers
is constantly changing, so many taxpayers who itemize one year may act on
that knowledge only to be limited to the standard deduction the next.
Every year, the group of taxpayers who itemize varies both in terms of
individual members and percentage of total taxpayers.91 From the perspective
of individual taxpayers, therefore, the decision to itemize deductions may
change from year to year. Although commentators repeatedly acknowledge
that a minority of taxpayers itemizes their deductions, many seem not to
acknowledge that this minority is not necessarily fixed. One argument in favor
of the standard deduction is that it frees a majority of taxpayers from the
recordkeeping associated with itemizing.92 That argument assumes, however,
both that taxpayers can predict that they will not be itemizing their deductions
for the relevant taxable year and that taxpayers know that recordkeeping is
only required for itemizers. Commentators seem to accept that both of these

Metacognitive Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting People Straight: Implications for
De-biasing and Public Information Campaigns, 39 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 127, 143 (2007) (suggesting that debiasing efforts often lead to reinforcing the
biases they seek to undo).
89 This Article does not endorse these beliefs, particularly those regarding low-income
taxpayers, but the rejection of them is not necessary to the validity of hypersalience as a
concept.
90 For tax year 2011, these would-be taxpayers with deductions right above or below
$5800 for single taxpayers. See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297.
91 See Clotfelter, supra note 67, at 682-83 (referring to the “substantial variation over
time in the number of taxpayers who” itemize, fluctuating from 16.4% in 1948 to 48.0% in
1970).
92 See Brooks, supra note 71, at 205.
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assumptions are correct.93 Yet the statistics about the fluctuating membership
of the group of taxpayers who itemize challenge these assumptions.
Furthermore, the assumption that all nonitemizers are aware that they will
not receive the charitable deduction also ignores that nonitemizers as a whole
may be less sophisticated about tax matters than itemizers.94 One reason for
this contention is that nonitemizers generally have lower incomes than do
itemizers; most higher-income taxpayers itemize their deductions.95 Nonitemizers are thus likely to have less of an incentive to educate themselves
about the actual effect of the charitable deduction, both because their lower
incomes mean that they likely make smaller charitable contributions, at least in
terms of absolute dollar amounts, than do itemizers96 and because their lower
tax rates make any deduction less valuable to them.97 Among non-itemizers,
many taxpayers therefore may be unaware of the effect of or requirements for
itemizing – or who incorrectly extrapolate from previous years – and believe
that they will receive a deduction for charitable donations.
The $56 billion difference between donations received and deductions
claimed is thus likely due, at least in part, to nonitemizers who believe they
will receive the charitable deduction. Some readers may argue that many of
those donors likely gave solely out of altruism and that none of them gave

93 See, e.g., Christopher M. Duquette, Is Charitable Giving by Nonitemizers Responsive
to Tax Incentives? New Evidence, 102 NAT’L TAX J. 195, 204 (1999) (“Nonitemizers . . . are
not required to maintain as many records for tax purposes.”); Krishna & Slemrod, supra
note 2, at 192 (“The tradeoff from a tax policy perspective is the cost of keeping records of
the deductions . . . . Having a standard deduction eliminates these costs for 70% of
individual taxpayers.”).
94 See Duquette, supra note 93, at 204 (“There is also the argument that nonitemizers
may be less sophisticated than itemizers in terms of understanding the tax code.”).
95 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 55, at 2 ( “[N]onitemizers tend to face lower tax
rates than itemizers do . . . .”); JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTION FOR NON-ITEMIZERS 6 (2003),
available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs5437/m1/1/high_res_d/RL31
108_2003May19.pdf ( “[I]t is in the lower income levels that the standard deduction is
normally taken.”); Toder & Rosenberg, supra note 72, at 695 (stating that in 2004, 53% of
taxpayers between the 50th and 90th percentiles of the AGI distribution itemized, as did
87% in the top 10th percentile).
96 Much has been written about the different recipients of donations from higher and
lower income taxpayers, as well as from itemizers and nonitemizers. See, e.g., CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 55, at 8 (suggesting that nonitemizers “tend to give to the same
types of organizations as taxpayers who itemize” but then pointing to data that indicate that
“the percentage of contributions going to religious organizations is larger for households
with lower income,” which “suggests that nonitemizers should tend to give a greater
proportion of their contributions to religious organizations”); Aprill, supra note 70, at 846
(citing studies suggesting that low-income taxpayers contribute primarily to the religious
institutions that they themselves attend).
97 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

1328

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1307

based on the belief that their donation would be deductible. A complete
response to this claim ultimately requires an interview with every donor at the
moment of her decision to donate. Although such a response is impossible, it
seems unlikely that all $56 billion is due to pure altruism when giving overall
has been shown to be motivated by many other impulses, including the
incentive created by the charitable deduction.98 If it turns out that a defined
group of taxpayers – here, those who did not itemize in 2008 but did donate to
charitable organizations in that same year – can be shown to donate entirely
out of pure altruism while others require a tax deduction for encouragement,
the literature and policy work on tax incentives needs to shift its focus to better
understand those two groups of taxpayers. More likely, however, some of the
itemizers responsible for the $173 billion of deducted donations and some of
the non-itemizers responsible for the other $56 billion of donations gave out of
pure altruism, while some proportion of both groups gave for other purposes,
including a belief that their donation would lower their tax burden. Even if
only a small number of non-itemizers donated in part based on a mistaken
understanding of the charitable deduction, the deduction is hypersalient due to
that over-response to its incentives.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HYPERSALIENCE
The above discussion of hypersalience and the charitable deduction leads to
a third potential question: why is hypersalience relevant? In other words, why
does hypersalience matter? This Part suggests that hypersalience matters for
three reasons: (1) it sheds light on the role of non-governmental actors in
fostering taxpayer ignorance of the tax system; (2) it challenges models on
which policy decisions rest; and (3) it may lead to an economically inefficient
level of consumption.
A.

Third-Party Marketing

One important aspect of hypersalience is the means by which revenuereducing tax provisions become hypersalient. Although it is possible that some
provisions become hypersalient due to government action or word-of-mouth,
one striking aspect of hypersalience is that it may frequently result from the
actions of private parties. Hypersalient provisions differ from hidden taxes in
that they are no longer in need of greater publicity to alert taxpayers to their
effect. Instead, they have already received such publicity. What differentiates
hypersalient revenue-reducing tax provisions from their hidden tax
counterparts is that to achieve the same degree of underestimation of taxes

98 See BRIAN KLUTH, 4 KEY FINDINGS FROM STATE OF THE P LATE: GIVING REBOUNDS FOR
SOME CHURCHES, BUT CHARITABLE DEDUCTION ISSUE LOOMS LARGE 2 (2011), available at
http://www.ecfa.org/Content/State-of-the-Plate-Research-Results (finding that 91% of
Christian pastors and church staff and leaders believed that a change in the charitable
deduction would change giving); Andreoni, supra note 60, at 464-77.
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owed on the part of a taxpayer, these provisions must be overly prominent. To
achieve this extreme prominence, the provision in question must be explicitly
marketed to taxpayers.
In the case of some hypersalient deductions, exclusions, and credits, the
marketing that leads to hypersalience is often undertaken by private99 thirdparty beneficiaries, rather than by government agencies or even quasigovernmental agencies. Instead of the Internal Revenue Service, the Treasury
Department, or even Congress alerting taxpayers to the workings of the tax
system, it has been those organizations that indirectly benefit from the relevant
tax provision that have publicized this tax provision to taxpayers.
The marketing to which this Article refers is not one-on-one marketing
between a fundraising director and a potential donor.100 Nor is it publicity in
the general press about the relevant tax provision (although that may arguably
play its own role in developing the hypersalience of some provisions.)101
Instead, this marketing includes direct mailings, television and radio spots,
announcements on websites, and other generally available advertising that, in
the process of requesting a payment, alerts potential customers to the
deductibility or excludability of that payment.102 This marketing is thus, from
the perspective of the marketers, only indirectly advertising the relevant tax
provision. Instead, it is primarily focused on raising funds or increasing
business. This marketing, however, has the secondary effect of informing
taxpayers of the benefits provided by the tax provision.
This third-party marketing contributes to hypersalience by only advertising
the tax benefits of a provision and not any associated limits. The statements
made by charitable organizations, for example, do not alert taxpayers to all of
the limits on the charitable deduction, nor do they lead potential donors to
believe that this deduction is available to a minority of taxpayers. Instead, they
repeatedly inform potential donors of one general concept: donations are tax99 For purposes of this Article, “private” is only meant to differentiate these beneficiaries
from the governmental bodies responsible for designing and granting the deduction.
100 For a discussion of the role of fundraising professionals in matching donors and
charitable organizations, see Schizer, supra note 70, at 231 (arguing that professional
fundraisers solve the “information problem” inherent in matching donors and charities that
would be appropriate for them).
101 For more on the general press and its role in informing taxpayers about the tax writing
process, see Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A
Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1179-80
(1993).
102 The idea of third-party marketing is so well-understood that a recent study of the
impact of matching grants on donations built on direct mail solicitations as part of the
experiment. Dean Karlan & John A. List, Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving?
Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1774, 1777
(2007) (“[B]y conducting the experiment through a communication channel commonly used
by large charities in the United States (direct mail), we are ensured that the results are of
practical interest.”).
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deductible. As discussed earlier, the itemization requirement means that this
statement is not true for the majority of potential givers.103
To illustrate the role of third-party marketing in contributing to the
hypersalience of the charitable deduction, this author’s research assistants
collected materials issued by charitable organizations that benefit from the
charitable deduction. Out of 500 randomly selected organizations that alerted
potential donors of the tax benefits of donating, 351 told potential donors that
donations were either “tax-deductible” or “fully tax-deductible”; 117 slightly
tempered this statement by telling potential donors that donations were
deductible “to the extent allowable by law.”104 While it is unlikely that these
organizations have banded together to advertise the charitable deduction itself,
that is the indirect effect of their efforts to increase donations. In alerting
would-be donors that donations qualify for deductible treatment, these
organizations are increasing the salience of the charitable deduction.105 In fact,
the frequency and variety of these messages make the deduction particularly
salient. Potential donors are bombarded by messages about the charitable
deduction whether they are at the ballet, taking their dog to the vet, sorting
through junk mail, or listening to the radio as they drive to work. For many
taxpayers, this is one of the few tax provisions that they hear and think about
when they are not preparing their taxes or making explicit payment or tax
planning decisions. Although 16 of the 500 organizations suggested that the
donor “consult with [a] tax advisor,” the most salient information from these
organizations as a group is that charitable donations are tax-deductible. Any
restrictions on such deductibility are not marketed to anywhere near the same
degree as the deductibility itself.
B.

Policy Implications

Along with highlighting the role of third-party beneficiaries in marketing
certain tax provisions, hypersalience also suggests that the models that

103

See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
These 500 organizations, which were compiled by the author, are divided such that
there are ten organizations from each of the fifty states. These organizations were found not
by searching for terms such as “tax-deductible” or “charitable deduction,” but rather by
randomly choosing a wide assortment of charitable organizations and contacting them
individually to determine whether they informed potential donors of the charitable
deduction. While some very small organizations did not, many of the organizations
contacted did include information about the deductibility of donations. Of those that did not
provide any information, many still referred to their “501(c)(3) status,” perhaps assuming
that tax exemption and deductible contributions are synonymous in the minds of donors.
The list of these organizations is on file with the author.
105 This is not to say that they are the only marketers. See, e.g., Tax Tip: Charitable
Contributions, YOUTUBE (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRX9GQ
ZMWZ4 (video informing taxpayers of documentation requirements of the charitable
contributions).
104
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policymakers use to assess the efficacy and cost of revenue-reducing tax
provisions may not be accurate. An example of this effect is the level to which
the hypersalience of the charitable deduction complicates models of price
elasticity of giving. The first study of price elasticity of giving was conducted
in 1967,106 and the actual elasticity of giving has been the subject of debate
since then. Price elasticity of giving essentially considers how responsive
charitable giving is to changes in the tax rate Since the price of a deductible
charitable donation decreases as tax rates increase, and vice versa, elastic
giving would mean that charitable donations increased as tax rates increased.
Although this Article does not aim to challenge existing models of price
elasticity of giving entirely, it argues that the concept of hypersalience adds
several new considerations to discussions and studies of price elasticity of
giving.
These considerations can be broken into three subcategories. First, many
models of the price elasticity of giving are affected by the hypersalience of the
charitable deduction. They generally use data that is limited to itemizers and
assume that all giving is deductible, without explicitly considering the
consequences on the models if these limitations and assumptions are incorrect
for the full universe of donors.107 Hypersalience thus highlights that many of
these models are perhaps more extreme in their assumptions than they may
state. Stated otherwise, the conclusions that can be drawn from these models
may be limited to the price elasticity of giving only for taxpayers who can
deduct their contributions.
Second, to date, models of price elasticity of giving have ignored the
distinction between subjective and objective understandings of the change in
tax rate.108 If some taxpayers give because they assume that they are receiving
a deduction when in fact they are not, what exactly does that mean for price
elasticity of giving? Their objective price of giving $1.00 is exactly that –
$1.00 – but they may believe that their price is much closer to $0.65.
Furthermore, even though their price of giving does not change when tax rates
change,109 they may respond to rate changes as if those changes affect their
price of giving. Current calculations of price elasticity of giving seem not to

106

See Karlan & List, supra note 101, at 1783.
See, e.g., Auten., supra note 62, at 13 (“The sample is generally restricted to those
taxpayers who itemized deductions, since information on donations for nonitemizers is
typically not available. Nonitemizers are included in 1985 and 1986, when they were
allowed to deduct, respectively, half and all of their contributions.”); Randolph, supra note
62, at 712 (“[G]iving is deductible.”); id. at 718 (“As in previous charity studies based on
tax return data, the sample excludes people who did not report amounts of giving because
they did not itemize deductions. Further, in keeping with many previous empirical studies,
the sample is also restricted to those taxpayers who would have itemized personal
deductions even without charitable deductions.”).
108 Edward McCaffery suggested a similar idea. McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1911.
109 This discussion assumes that rate changes do not change taxpayers’ ability to deduct.
107
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consider this effect of subjective understandings of the price of giving, as
current calculations are generally focused on the price elasticity of giving by
those donors who can deduct donations. Hypersalience suggests, however, that
these calculations may underestimate the total price elasticity of giving in that
some taxpayers not currently included in estimates of price elasticity of giving
may actually be responsive even when their objective change in price is zero.
Even if these nonitemizers who subjectively believe that their price has
changed are less responsive than itemizers,110 any change in giving in response
to a perceived change in price that does not in fact exist complicates the
concept of elasticity. While one could argue that the idea of a subjective
understanding of price means that some donors apply the same price elasticity
of giving but underestimate the price, many models of price elasticity of giving
are applied to objective changes in price and ignore the fact that some donors
may distort their behavior based on a price other than the actual price.
This complication of the price elasticity of giving is not a response to
attempts to estimate the price elasticity of giving if nonitemizers were
permitted to itemize their deductions. Several academics have attempted to
calculate that figure, with quite varied outcomes, in the face of proposals to
extend the charitable deduction to nonitemizers.111 Those studies focused on
the question of how current nonitemizers (whose price of giving $1.00 is now
$1.00) would react were their objective price of giving actually to decrease.
Instead, this Article suggests that current nonitemizers (whose objective price
of giving $1.00 is still $1.00) may act as if their price of giving is in fact less.
In other words, the objective price, the price on which price elasticity depends,
remains the same, but the giving itself may be more elastic because it is based
on a subjective (and incorrect) understanding of the price of that giving.
Third, a final addition to the concept of price elasticity of giving is the
distinction between total giving and claimed giving. Despite its name, price
elasticity of giving is not a measurement of the responsiveness of charitable
giving to changes in the price of that giving. Instead, it is a measurement of
the responsiveness of claimed charitable giving to changes in the price of that
110 Estimates of the price elasticity of giving have suggested that giving by nonitemizers
is less elastic than giving by itemizers when nonitemizers are permitted to deduct. See, e.g.,
Duquette, supra note 93, at 201.
111 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 55, at 10-11 (explaining that, because the
“effect of the tax incentive on nonitemizers is much more difficult to estimate,” its
predictions of nonitemizer giving if the deduction is extended to them will use multiple
possible elasticities, ranging from -0.2 to -1.0); GRAVELLE, supra note 95, at 5 (suggesting
that nonitemizers may have lower elasticity because price elasticities are lower at lower
income levels); Aprill, supra note 70, at 857-59 (discussing and critiquing studies
attempting to determine the price elasticity of nonitemizers). One particular flaw with
attempts to determine the price elasticity of nonitemizers is that many studies rely on data
from the one year in which nonitemizers could take the full deduction; this year, 1986, was
also characterized by many other incentives to give, not least of which was the fact that the
extension to nonitemizers was going to be repealed.
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giving. A similar critique has been noted in articles suggesting that taxpayers
incorrectly deduct more charitable contributions than they actually made, but
this Article employs the opposite critique. Not only do price-elasticity-ofgiving calculations incorrectly include fraudulent donations in the tally of total
giving, but they also incorrectly exclude unclaimed donations.112
These last two complications to the models of price elasticity of giving
suggest a similar point: current models may underestimate total price elasticity
of giving. Since these models generally include the change in giving as the
numerator and the change in tax rate (or price) as the denominator, the two
complications just discussed serve to level the same criticism at current
calculations of price elasticity. Subjective perceptions of price mean that the
denominator of the calculation may currently be overestimated by not
including those donors who change their donations even though their objective
change in price is zero; exclusion of unclaimed donations means that the
numerator may currently be underestimated, because some donations that may
have been made in reaction to perceived changes in price are not included.
Together, both contentions suggest that the total price elasticity of giving may
be underestimated if the concept of hypersalience is not considered. These
claims require significant empirical research for substantiation. They are
offered here to suggest the impact that the concept of hypersalience may have
on discussions beyond salience.113
Taken together, these complications to models of the price elasticity of
giving provide one overarching implication of hypersalience: once this
phenomenon is considered, the models on which policymakers are basing their
conclusions may change. This, in turn, may mean that the conclusions – and
thus the resulting policies – could change were hypersalience considered.
Therefore, in the context of the charitable deduction, discussions of the
deduction may not accurately consider the amount of charitable giving tied to
the deduction if models ignore hypersalience and the potentially resultant
overreaction on the part of taxpayers who believe themselves to be subject to
the deduction. Hypersalience may also change the models used to support
policy decisions relating to other tax provisions. Although these are not
explored here, the many complications added to price elasticity of giving
suggest similar complications could be raised in other policy areas, such as
home purchases supported by the home mortgage interest deduction or school
enrollment supported by educational benefits in the Internal Revenue Code.
The effect of hypersalience on models of price elasticity of giving may in
turn have ramifications for the treasury efficiency of revenue-reducing tax

112 For an example of such exclusion, see Duquette, supra note 93, tbls.1 & 2
(calculating giving based on the claimed deductions of nonitemizers).
113 It is possible that models of price elasticity of giving are also complicated by
offsetting errors. The charitable deduction may, for example, have low salience for some
itemizers. This Article does not consider specific offsetting errors, but it recognizes them as
a possible further complication to models of price elasticity of giving.
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provisions such as the charitable deduction. Treasury-efficient provisions are
those provisions that cost the fisc less than they raise; treasury-inefficient
provisions cost the fisc more than they raise.114 Hypersalience suggests that
the charitable deduction may be more treasury efficient than previously
thought. Price elasticity and treasury efficiency both respond to the question of
whether the charitable deduction is worth its cost to the government.115 For a
change to the charitable deduction to be treasury efficient, it must raise more
money for charitable organizations than it loses for the government. If the
charitable deduction induces even one non-itemizing taxpayer to make more
charitable contributions than she otherwise would have, then the deduction in
that case cost the government nothing but created a distortion that led more
money to flow to a charitable organization. This makes the deduction more
treasury efficient than previously thought. This claim may extend to other
hypersalient tax provisions, suggesting that they may be more treasury efficient
than previously believed.
If revenue-reducing tax provisions such as the charitable deduction are more
treasury efficient than previously thought, debates over tax expenditures may
be missing a potential argument in favor of tax expenditures over direct
spending. The term “tax expenditures” refers to tax provisions that allow
taxpayers not to pay taxes that normally would be due.116 Because tax
expenditures represent revenue foregone by the government, they are
essentially spending provisions within the Internal Revenue Code.117
Deductions, exclusions, and credits are all examples of tax expenditures in
that, in their absence, the government would raise more revenue.118 Despite a
recent opinion by the Supreme Court questioning the full extent of this
equivalency,119 both academics and government actors have generally accepted
the concept of tax expenditures as spending.120 Although Surrey, who
114

See Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J.
1047, 1059 (2009).
115 For more on this question, see JOSEPH CORDES, THE URBAN INST., THE COST OF
GIVING: HOW DO CHANGES IN TAX DEDUCTIONS AFFECT CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS?
(1999) (summarizing a seminar in April 1999 on “whether the benefits derived from the
charitable tax deduction are worth the cost”).
116 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 45, at 2.
117 See id. (citing Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The
U.S. Income Tax System – the Need for a Full Accounting, Excerpts from Remarks Before
the Money Marketeers (Nov. 15, 1967), in U. S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1968, at 322 (1969)) (describing Stanley Sturrey as introducing the idea of
government expenditures through a tax system).
118 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 45, at 2.
119 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1444 (2011)
(distinguishing between tax credits and governmental expenditures). But see id. at 1452-53
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
120 For a discussion of the use of tax expenditures in the budget, see Edward D.
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introduced the term “tax expenditure,” ultimately wanted to use tax
expenditures to shift spending out of the Internal Revenue Code and into the
direct spending arena,121 the number of tax expenditures has risen sharply since
they were first included in the budget calculation of the Joint Committee on
Taxation.122
This increase has led to ongoing debates about the role of tax expenditures
and whether some or all of these expenditures would be more effective,
efficient, or transparent as direct spending measures.123 One strong argument
against the increasing number of tax expenditures is that, by placing spending
within the Internal Revenue Code, Congress essentially hides these spending
provisions from the eyes of voters.124 Debates over tax expenditures often
center around whether tax expenditures should be used for spending programs
that may be better suited to direct spending. The idea of hypersalience
complicates these debates. If tax expenditures do not just induce those
taxpayers from whom the government is foregoing revenue to distort their
behavior and donate more to charity, but induce that same behavior from
taxpayers from whom the government has not foregone any revenue, then the
debate over tax expenditures may need to be updated. Tax expenditures are an
unquestionably large cost to government. In 2008, for example, tax
expenditures totaled $1.2 trillion, which Kleinbard described as “greater than
the entire amount raised by the individual income tax in 2008, or for that
matter all federal discretionary spending in that year (in each case, about $1.1
trillion). Indeed, it is more than twice as much as all non-defense discretionary
spending in 2008 ($528 billion).”125 Hypersalience suggests, however, that
some tax expenditures may actually be achieving distortionary goals at a lower
cost than were they direct spending measures.126 In short, for the deductions
and other expenditures that are hypersalient, Congress may be getting more
than its money’s worth, in that it is inducing distortions in some taxpayers
without having to pay for them.

Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget
and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (2010).
121 See SURREY, supra note 54, at 198.
122 See Kleinbard, supra note 120, at 13 (pointing out the increase from sixty tax
expenditures in the Joint Committee on Taxation’s first list in 1972 to 247 in 2008).
123 See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 101, at 1166 (asserting that tax expenditures may in
fact be more transparent than other types of spending because “the institutions formulating
and administering tax policy are more competitive and visible than their direct outlay
counterparts because tax institutions are subject to more numerous and diverse
constituencies”).
124 See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 120, at 28 (“[T]he irresistible political attraction of
tax expenditures lies in their invisibility to normal inspection of the budget . . . .”).
125 Id. at 13.
126 This claim assumes that direct spending measures would not also be limited to
itemizers or have other low-salience limits restricting their availability.
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This argument only applies, of course, to those tax expenditures that are
explicitly intended to achieve some sort of behavioral distortion. As discussed
in a Joint Committee on Taxation proposal from 2008, not all tax expenditures
are intended to do so.127 For those that are intended to create distortions,
however, hypersalience suggests that there may be a new argument to consider
in the debate over tax expenditures. Tax expenditures whose effect is
overestimated by taxpayers may be more cost-effective for the government
than previously expected. In other words, hypersalient tax expenditures may
create more behavioral change at a lower cost to the government because some
taxpayers wrongly believe that their distorted behavior will lead to tax benefits.
C.

Increased Consumption

Along with shedding light on third-party marketing and changing the shape
of policy debates, hypersalience also may lead taxpayers to increase their
consumption of goods that they wrongly believe will reduce their tax liability.
Although this result is implicit in the policy implications discussed above, it is
also significant enough to be discussed as a stand-alone issue. In the context of
the charitable deduction, this increased consumption may not seem particular
concerning given that the “consumption” in question is charitable giving.
In the context of other tax provisions, however, the increased consumption
resulting from hypersalience may be of greater concern. One provision that
illustrates this concern is the home mortgage interest deduction, which is likely
to be extremely salient for many Americans.128 As McCaffery explained,
many of his own students overvalued the benefits of this provision even after
being taught about the specifics of the deduction.129 As with charitable
donations, home mortgage interest is popularly understood to be fully
deductible and yet is in reality only available to itemizers.
Although homeowners in general may be more likely to itemize than renters
or other taxpayers that do not own their own homes,130 there may still be a

127

See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 45, at 12-13 (distinguishing Tax
Transfers, which “usually are based on perceived need as measured by income,” from both
Social Spending and Business Synthetic Spending, both of which are “intended to subsidize
or induce behavior”).
128 See William G. Gale et al., Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115
TAX NOTES 1171, 1171 ( 2007) (“The income tax deduction for mortgage interest payments
is possibly the best-known federal housing policy and is deeply ingrained in the economic
and social fabric of the country.”).
129 See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1918.
130 One reason for this is that home ownership is generally associated with higher
incomes, and, as noted in Part II supra, higher income taxpayers are more likely to itemize
their deductions. A second reason is that the mortgage interest deduction itself creates many
itemizers, in that mortgage payments are often in and of themselves enough to meet the
standard deduction limit. Finally, homeowners are often also subject to property taxes,
which are also itemizable expenses. If the mortgage payments are not sufficient to
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difference between the public perception of home mortgage interest as fully
deductible and the actual extent of that deductibility. For many homeowners,
the combination of home mortgage interest and property tax payments is
sufficient to exceed the standard deduction. For these owners, the difference
between hypersalience and full salience is likely not very large because home
ownership creates sufficient deductions to exceed the limit on those very
deductions. In tax year 2008, the average deduction for mortgage interest was
$12,221, well above the cut-off for the standard deduction.131 For higherincome taxpayers, therefore, the home mortgage interest deduction is likely
merely salient, rather than hypersalient.
It is not clear, however, that this is true for all homeowners. Given that a
large majority of Americans own their own homes, while a minority itemize
deductions,132 there may be many homeowners with mortgages who are not
able to deduct their interest payments because they do not surpass the standard
deduction.133 In tax year 2009, thirty-seven million returns claimed the
mortgage interest deduction;134 in that same year, there were approximately
forty-seven million home acquisition loans and thirteen million home equity
loans and lines of credit.135 It is possible that those thirty-seven million returns
claimed all of the associated mortgage interest payments. It is also possible –
and seems more likely – that up to twenty-three million mortgages and home
equity loans did not create tax-deductible interest payments for a variety of
reasons.
Furthermore, since only the interest is deductible on a home mortgage, and
mortgage amortization tables generally schedule principal payments for later in
the mortgage, homeowners who rightly understood the deduction to apply to
them in the first few years of their mortgage may be surprised to learn that they
overcome the standard deduction limit, the combination of these payments with property tax
payments may be sufficient.
131 PATRICK FLEENOR, TAX FOUND., TAX SAVINGS FROM MORTGAGE INTEREST
DEDUCTION VARY SIGNIFICANTLY FROM STATE TO STATE 2 tbl.1 (2010).
132 See Gale et al., supra note 128, at 1172 (stating that the homeownership rate in 2005
was sixty-nine percent); David Streitfeld, Economy Gains, Yet Housing Spirals Downward,
BOS. GLOBE, MAY 31, 2011, at 5 (stating that homeownership rates fell to 66.4% in 2010).
This could be due to hypersalience combined with low mortgage and property rates. It
could also, however, be due to homeowners who have fully paid off their homes.
133 As with the charitable deduction, the difference may be larger for lower-income
taxpayers whose home mortgage interest payments are not sufficient to surpass the standard
deduction limit. See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 128, at 1179 (“[N]ew homeowners
typically are lower- or middle-income households who do not itemize.”).
134 DEP’T OF REVENUE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS
2009, PUBLICATION 1304 (REV. 07-2011), at 82 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub
/irs-soi/09inalcr.pdf (listing itemized deductions by type).
135 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AMERICAN
HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 65 tbl.3-15 (2011) (listing mortgage
characteristics of owner-occupied units).
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are no longer able to deduct the same portion of their mortgage payment in
later years, even as their payment stays the same. Thus, for some homeowners,
the home mortgage interest deduction may very well be hypersalient.
If true, it is worth considering what this means for the consumption of
homes. The hypersalience of the home mortgage interest deduction could
potentially lead to increased consumption, either because taxpayers buy homes
that they would not have purchased or because taxpayers buy more expensive
homes than they otherwise would have purchased. While some readers and
policymakers may support the goal of home ownership for all Americans,136
others may see the recent housing bubble and resulting economic collapse as a
warning sign that perhaps this goal is not appropriate.137 Many commentators
have pointed out that the common knowledge of the home mortgage interest
deduction has likely led to increased home prices,138 and the recent housing
bubble has been attributed, at least in part, to taxpayer over-response to the
home mortgage interest deduction.139
This Article is not aiming to prove that the home mortgage interest
deduction is hypersalient, nor is it entering the debate on the impact of this tax
provision on consumption of overpriced homes.140 It is instead using the home
136

See, e.g., Home Ownership Moves the Economy (HOME) Act of 2009, H.R. 2801,
111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to amend the IRC to expand and extend the first-time
homebuyer credit); Expanding American Homeownership Act of 2007, H.R. 1852, 110th
Cong. (2007) (proposing to modernize and update the National Housing Act and enable the
Federal Housing Administration to use risk-based pricing to more effectively reach
undeserved borrowers).
137 See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the
Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 278 (2010) ( “Housing
tax policies fueled the boom and exacerbated the bust.”); Christian A. L. Hilber & Tracy M.
Turner, The Mortgage Interest Deduction and Its Impact on Homeownership Decisions
(Aug. 12, 210) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (finding that the deduction
has the overall effect of inflating home prices and reducing home ownership). For more on
the positive and negative externalities of home ownership, see Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse
M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 28-36 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9284, 2002).
138 See Gale et al., supra note 128, at 1171 (arguing that the main effect of the home
mortgage interest deduction is “to raise the price of housing and land and to encourage
people who do buy homes to borrow more and to buy larger homes than they otherwise
would”).
139 But see id. (arguing that the mortgage interest deduction “does little if anything to
encourage home ownership”); Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 137, at 38-40 (concluding that
the home mortgage interest deduction does little to change the rate of homeownership).
140 Professors Gale, Gruber, and Stephens-Davidowitz discussed the impact of the
deduction on consumption of homes in their article about the home mortgage interest
deduction. See Gale et al., supra note 128, at 1178 (“It is possible that members of some
groups, low-income groups in particular, are persuaded by others to purchase homes when
they are not really prepared to take on the burdens and responsibilities of homeownership,
or to take out unduly risky loans to finance a home purchase. To the extent that potential
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mortgage deduction as an example of the increased consumption that is one of
the potential ramifications of hypersalience.
IV. HYPERSALIENCE: TO EXPAND OR CURTAIL?
The concept of hypersalience raises a multitude of questions, but perhaps
the most immediate question is whether this characteristic is to be encouraged
or discouraged. If a reader believes that hypersalience is a potentially good
thing, then it makes sense to consider which other tax provisions are or could
become hypersalient and how to achieve such hypersalience. If a reader
believes that hypersalience is a bad thing overall, then the opposite is true and
it makes sense to consider how to reduce the salience of tax provisions such
that they become fully, but not overly, salient.
A.

The Costs and Benefits of Hypersalience

Since this Article has considered hypersalience primarily through the lens of
the charitable deduction, at first it may seem that the benefits of taxpayer
overestimation of the incidence of certain tax provisions outweigh any costs.
If hypersalience suggests that the government may be inducing more charitable
contributions without having to subsidize those donations, what can be wrong
with this phenomenon? Some readers may see the appeal of a concept that
achieves certain desired policy goals without the expense of either government
marketing or the lost revenues that would be associated with a charitable
deduction available to all taxpayers.
The primary argument in favor of hypersalience rests on the concept of
treasury efficiency. Although some may argue that the charitable deduction is
economically inefficient given that it induces individuals to distort their
behaviors from what they would do in the absence of a tax system, one of the
primary rationales for the charitable deduction is that it creates an incentive for
individuals to donate more to charitable organizations than they otherwise
would.141 Accepting that this inefficiency is one of the rationales of the
deduction, the charitable deduction is arguably more treasury efficient than
previously believed because of hypersalience. If a taxpayer mistakenly
believes that she will benefit from a deduction and thus changes her behavior

purchasers are making systematically poor decisions in favor of buying homes, it would be
appropriate for policy to discourage those home purchases at the margin.”). So too did
Glaeser and Shapiro consider whether the deduction had an effect on the consumption of
homes. See Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 137, at 3 (“While the deduction appears to
increase the amount spent on housing, it appears to have almost no effect on the
homeownership rate.”).
141 See C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective
Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable
Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 399, 403 (1995) (citing RICHARD GOODE, THE
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX (1976) and stating that “incentives were the primary purpose of the
deduction”).
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to take advantage of this deduction, the indirect beneficiary of the deduction
raises revenue. Since that taxpayer does not in fact benefit from the deduction,
however, the government does not lose any revenue. The government thus has
paid nothing for the behavioral distortion. In the context of the charitable
deduction, when a nonitemizer donates more to charitable organizations based
on a belief that she will receive the deduction, greater charitable giving was
achieved without any foregone revenue. This over-responsiveness to the
charitable deduction may be even more beneficial to charities than suggested
here. If increased donations lead to increased volunteering,142 then perhaps
leading people to believe that they will receive a charitable deduction would
not only increase donations but could in fact increase both donations and
volunteer activity.
This increased treasury efficiency may suggest not only that the
hypersalience that currently exists should be permitted but also that
hypersalience should be extended to other tax provisions. This argument is
similar to arguments made in favor of taking advantage of insights into hidden
taxes to achieve policy goals.143 Commentators who favor using hidden taxes
argue that they provide a tool for raising revenue without excessive distortion.
The strongest argument in favor of hypersalience is thus that it achieves greater
distortions without foregoing revenue.
Despite these benefits, hypersalience also has significant costs. Many of the
concerns that hypersalience raises are similar to those raised by its inverse, low
salience. Hypersalience raises issues about misinformation, tax literacy, and
government paternalism. These issues are made even more complex by the
fact that hypersalience often occurs due to marketing by private parties acting
in their own self-interest.
The first concern with hypersalience relates to the fact that this
overestimation of benefits is, at its core, fundamentally a cognitive
misperception. In other words, taxpayers believe that they will receive a
deduction for charitable contributions, regardless of their income or other
deductible expenses, because they misunderstand the tax system. In this way,
hypersalience mirrors low salience. On either side of the salience spectrum,
taxpayers wrongly believe that they know how the tax system works. This
misunderstanding – or acceptance of misinformation – has been criticized in
the context of low salience for being yet another example of tax illiteracy.
Commentators argue that encouraging such misinformation, even if the

142

See CORDES, supra note 115, at 3 ( “[S]ome studies have found that when people give
money to charities they are also more likely to volunteer their time.”).
143 See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1942-43 (critically citing Jane Gravelle as saying,
“[R]ather than despair over the public’s lack of economic knowledge, there may be scope
for using their characteristic biases in the name of good tax policy.”); Schenk, supra note 6,
at 284 (arguing for “intentionally exploiting political salience . . . . Assuming that the state
has the power to levy taxes and an appropriate need for revenue, it is proper for it to choose
a form that is most palatable to its citizens.”).
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misinformation leads to positive ends, such as greater contributions to
charitable organizations, is fundamentally wrong.144 These arguments are
premised on practical concerns that this practice will send the tax system down
a slippery slope of misinformation and distrust, as well as moral concerns that
misleading others, regardless of the context or the purpose, is undemocratic.145
The second concern with hypersalience relates to the distortions that it may
induce. While some readers may applaud the suggestion that a hypersalient
charitable deduction encourages more charitable contributions without costing
the government any lost revenue when the contributions are made by nonitemizers or other taxpayers unable to tax advantage of the deduction, the fact
remains that an action in which a taxpayer would not engage in giving but for a
tax incentive is inefficient.146 If a taxpayer who would otherwise not have
donated to a charitable organization did so because of her misunderstanding of
the tax system, that is a behavioral distortion that would not have occurred in
the absence of the tax system.
A final concern about the hypersalience of tax provisions focuses on the
parties who are at least partially creating this situation. If hypersalience is due
to marketing by private third-party beneficiaries acting in their own selfinterest, it is worth asking whether we want the tax system being advertised by
such parties. In a climate of taxpayer illiteracy, does it make sense for third
parties to spread information about deductions and the tax system as a whole?
Charitable organizations, for example, have every reason to make strong
claims about the deductibility of donations if they believe – rightly, based on
many models of the price elasticity of giving – that these claims will induce
taxpayers to give more in donations. They have far fewer reasons to temper
these strong claims by explaining the limits of the deductibility of charitable
contributions in detail, and it appears that they do not feel the need to do so.

144

McCaffery & Baron, supra note 16, at 1781 (rejecting the argument in favor of
making taxes more psychologically palatable by lowering their salience by stating that such
a view is “wrong – dangerously wrong – for several reasons”). But see Schenk, supra note
6, at 287-89 (providing several responses to the critique that use of low-salience taxes
exploits ignorance: government must always weigh costs and trade-offs, including the value
of instrumentalist approaches in the context of their ultimate goals; voter preferences are
never clearly discerned; perhaps citizens prefer to be misled about the actual steps taken to
raise needed revenue; and law is inherently designed to create incentives for certain
behavior).
145 McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1943 (“[E]xploiting cognitive error for noble purposes is
fraught with danger . . . . Especially if one believes, as I do, that the prevalence of cognitive
error has, in the main, blocked the evolution of a more sensible as well as a more
progressive, egalitarian, just tax structure, the cognitive manipulation approach seems to run
the risk of winning the battle at the expense of the war. Furthermore, the manipulative
strategy runs afoul of basic moral notions; it shows disrespect for the people, and treats them
as obstacles to be overcome in getting to the right result.”); see also Zelenak, supra note 85,
at 102-03 (criticizing a black-box tax system for being undemocratic).
146 Saez, supra note 28, at 2.

1342

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1307

Due to these incentives, it is no surprise that a marketing campaign run by
private third-party beneficiaries would lead to hypersalience of the deduction.
Furthermore, given that the determination of whether a taxpayer can deduct
a charitable contribution is a complicated one, based on the way in which a
host of tax provisions apply to each individual taxpayer, it may make sense
that many of the marketing materials issued by charitable organizations refer to
the benefits of the deduction in the broadest of terms, without identifying any
possibly relevant limitations. The result, however, is that many of the
statements by private third-party beneficiaries are so succinct and broad that
they are particularly memorable and appealingly oversimplified.
By
presenting the charitable deduction in its most basic form, stripped of the
complexities associated with much of the Internal Revenue Code, private thirdparty beneficiaries have presented it in such a way as to both increase the
salience of the deduction and decrease the salience of its limitations, thereby
contributing to both elements of hypersalience.
This Article does not intend to suggest that charitable organizations are
maliciously misinforming taxpayers in order to induce them to give money that
they would not otherwise donate. Given the high number of charitable
organizations, coupled with the fact that the majority of charitable
organizations are quite small,147 it is unlikely that these organizations are
uniting to mislead taxpayers.148 However, for readers concerned about
hypersalience, the fact that this state is often achieved by the actions of private
third parties that both have little incentive to downplay the effect of certain tax
provisions and that have high incentives to present those tax provisions and
their benefits in the broadest light possible may be yet another argument in
favor of curtailing hypersalience.
As alluded to in the earlier discussion of the home mortgage interest
deduction,149 the problems of hypersalience are perhaps even more worrisome
because this phenomenon is likely not limited to the charitable deduction.
Many revenue-reducing tax provisions are subject to a host of misunderstood
limits and are therefore candidates for hypersalience if their benefits are highly
salient yet subject to such limits.

147 See KENNARD T. WING, KATIE L. ROEGER & THOMAS H. POLLAK, THE URBAN INST.,
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING 2 (2010),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412209-nonprof-public-charities.pdf
(reporting that approximately two-thirds of nonprofits collected less than $25,000 in gross
receipts).
148 It is particularly unlikely that organizations are uniting to mislead taxpayers since
there is hardly any guidance provided to these organizations about marketing. It appears
that, rather than following specific instructions provided by any oversight body,
organizations are instead following the example of other organizations, thus creating a
snowball effect of marketing where the wording in one organization’s successful campaign
is repeated by many other organizations.
149 See supra Part III.C.
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One reason that hypersalience may characterize more than just the charitable
deduction provision is that itemization is not the only limit that may be hidden
to taxpayers. Two other limitations that do not apply to the charitable
deduction but that do limit the applicability of certain other revenue-reducing
tax provisions are the floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions and the
alternative minimum tax (AMT). Unlike many other itemized deductions,150
the charitable deduction is not a “miscellaneous itemized deduction.”151 If it
were, taxpayers would only be permitted to deduct charitable contributions
once they exceeded 2% of adjusted gross income.152 Also unlike many other
itemized deductions, the charitable deduction remains deductible under the
AMT. Since the overall purpose of the AMT is to create a broader base to
ensure that high-income taxpayers do not escape taxation through the judicious
use of deductions,153 many deductions are disallowed under the AMT. These
provisions, known as “tax preferences,” are not available to those taxpayers
who are subject to the AMT.154 Because the AMT’s reach has increased in
recent years,155 more and more taxpayers are losing the ability to take
deductions that they would have been able to take under the regular tax system;
many of these taxpayers do not learn of the disallowance of their deductions
until they (or their preparers) are filing their taxes. These other limitations
suggest that while the charitable deduction is a useful example of the
complicated limits that apply to deductions that taxpayers may believe to be
fairly simple, it is far from the only deduction that is so limited.156
Furthermore, provisions may be hypersalient even when they are not limited
by the itemization requirement.157
150 Compare I.R.C. § 67(b) (2006) (listing the itemized deductions that are not
miscellaneous itemized deductions), with id. §§ 161-224 (listing itemized deductions for
individuals).
151 Id. § 67(b)(4). Note that there have been proposals to treat the charitable deduction as
a miscellaneous itemized deduction. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 55, at 24 (citing
a Joint Committee on Taxation estimate of the revenue effects of limiting the charitable
deduction for itemizers who gave more than two percent of their adjusted gross income).
152 I.R.C. § 67(a).
153 See Schenk, supra note 6, at 279 (“The original purpose of the AMT was to insure
that high income individuals paid at least some income tax . . . .”).
154 The two largest tax preferences that are not allowed under the AMT are state and
local tax deductions and personal exemptions. See Zelenak, supra note 85, at 101.
155 Id. at 100 (recognizing an increase in the number of taxpayers subject to the AMT,
from 20,000 in 1970 to four million in 2005).
156 Previous commentators have highlighted the complexity created by the AMT and the
fact that it makes it harder for individuals to accurately predict the taxes they will owe. See
Schenk, supra note 6, at 279 (“Because of the interaction of the AMT with the regular tax
rate schedule as well as the fact that the AMT base and regular base differ, it is difficult for
taxpayers to determine their actual marginal rate.”); Zelenak, supra note 85, at 102 ( “[T]he
AMT turns the tax system into a black box for those taxpayers to whom it applies.”).
157 Hypersalience may also be more common if some revenue-raising tax provisions are
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Thus, hypersalience may characterize more than just the charitable
deduction. Given that it may lead to overconsumption of goods, as well as the
facts that it is based on taxpayer illiteracy and at least partly due to the actions
of self-interested third-party beneficiaries, this Article concludes that the costs
of hypersalience outweigh any benefits. This conclusion is based primarily on
the role of misinformation in hypersalience. Although the ability to achieve
substantive policy goals at a lower cost to the government may seem appealing
to some readers, particularly in a political and economic climate focused on
limiting government spending, this ability exists only because taxpayers are
acting on a misunderstanding of how the tax system works. The fact that this
misunderstanding may often be due to the actions of private third-party
beneficiaries only increases the concerns raised by hypersalience.
B.

How to Curtail Hypersalience

If hypersalience is overall a negative, what policy changes could best
address the problems raised above? Some readers may argue that the only
response is to change the tax system so drastically that hypersalience would be
impossible. The charitable deduction, for example, could be allowed for all
taxpayers, not just itemizers, and its other limits could be eliminated. A
hypersalient provision becomes fully salient only when all limits and
restrictions are eliminated (or made equally salient to the benefits of the
provision). The downside of such a modification would be sharply decreased
government revenues. This would also raise significant questions about the
role of the standard deduction and the charitable deduction itself. If the
standard deduction is meant to act as a rough estimate of itemized deductions
for those who do not itemize, why would the charitable deduction not be
included in that estimate? Would this modification to the charitable deduction
pave the way for the allowance of all itemized deductions for nonitemizers? Is
the purpose of the charitable deduction to subsidize every dollar donated, or is
it instead to subsidize only donations above a certain limit? Moreover, this
proposal raises the unanswerable question of whether it is possible to reach full
salience without sliding along the spectrum to either hypersalience or low
salience. Regardless of the answer, however, a wholesale upending of our tax
system in response to the hypersalience of certain tax provisions seems both
unlikely and unnecessarily extreme for a first step.
Alternatively, some readers may contend that the fact that third-party
marketers are at least partially responsible for hypersalience suggests that a
proactive government response is the only way to curtail hypersalience. Such
government action could include government advertisements emphasizing the
limits of hypersalient provisions or penalties for third-party beneficiaries that
mislead donors with their marketing.
Neither of these ideas is
themselves hypersalient. This Article does not consider such provisions, but it welcomes
further research on hypersalience revenue-raising tax provisions. Such provisions may
include the estate tax and the capital gains tax.
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unprecedented.158 This Article, however, rejects both of these approaches as
too extreme for a first step. The first approach will likely do little to increase
taxpayer morale in that it will mean that many taxpayers’ only direct
interaction with the IRS will involve the government emphasizing the
complexity of the tax system, as well as the fact that a broadly popular tax
provision is not in fact available to many taxpayers. Furthermore, it may not
fully offset the marketing efforts by private parties because the latter may still
prove more salient than occasional advertisements by the government. The
second approach will also likely lower taxpayer morale and create a negative
impression of the government, since it involves penalizing charitable
organizations, which may be more popular with taxpayers than the IRS.
The best initial response to hypersalience for those who aim to curtail it is
one that harnesses the power of those entities that currently contribute to
hypersalience. Rather than changing the provisions that are themselves
hypersalient or using government resources to create negative advertisements
or impose penalties, the response preferred by this Article focuses on the
To limit hypersalience, the
marketing that creates hypersalience.159
government could limit statements made by private third-party beneficiaries
about tax-deductibility. The government already provides numerous limits on
charitable organizations,160 and restricting their marketing efforts could be

158 For examples of government advertisements, see, for example, Internal Revenue
Serv.,
Tax
Tip:
Summer
Day
Camp
Expenses,
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iehimv_UEY4 (Jul. 8, 2010) (informing parents that
summer day camp expenses may qualify for the child and dependent care credit). See also
Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 483, 507 (2009) (providing scripts for potential television spots); Joshua D. Rosenberg,
The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane,
16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 228-32 (1996) (proposing, inter alia, a television spot featuring
Charles Barkley).
For examples of penalties already placed on certain organizations if they mislead
taxpayers about the deductibility of donations, see I.R.C. §§ 6113 and 6710 (2006). Section
6113 prohibits certain organizations from incorrectly telling donors that non-deductible
donations are deductible; section 6710 imposes a penalty of up to $10,000 per year if those
organizations do not follow the requirements of section 6113. For more on this regime, see
Gregory I. Devorkin, Dual Character Contributions: A Proposed Penalty to Deter Charities
from Providing Erroneous Information Regarding Deductibility, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 294, 305
(1992).
159 One reason to impose limitations or penalties on the charitable organizations rather
than the taxpayers is that it would offset the current indirect penalty. See Devorkin, supra
note 158, at 316 (stating in the context of dual character contributions that the “only existing
deterrent is indirect [in that] charities may refrain from issuing erroneous or false receipts if
they fear that future fund-raising campaigns will be hurt if their contributors are audited and
assessed deficiencies against them”).
160 See IRS, COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) PUBLIC CHARITIES (2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221pc.pdf (outlining IRS enforcement procedures for
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another such limit. Such limits need not amount to a full prohibition on thirdparty marketing, since that may have the effect of reducing the salience of both
the deduction and its limits, rather than increasing the salience of the limits. A
full-scale prohibition could also potentially run afoul of constitutional limits.161
Instead, the IRS and the Treasury could build on precedents such as Circular
230 or guidance to nonprofit organizations receiving dual-purpose
contributions and encourage charitable organizations to modify their marketing
materials.162 As shown by the 500 organizations whose marketing efforts were
reviewed for this Article, while some organizations advise donors to contact
their tax advisors or suggest that tax deductions only apply to the vague “extent
provided by law,” many provide no such guidance. A first step could thus be
to encourage third-party beneficiaries to use their marketing materials to
convey more accurately the application of relevant tax provisions.
Rather than leading to low salience, as could happen with a blanket
prohibition on third-party marketing, this solution would ideally push the
charitable deduction and other hypersalient provisions closer to full salience,
with taxpayers understanding the extent to which they may take advantage of
this deduction. Similar proposals have been made in the context of hidden
taxes, with McCaffery suggesting a “quasi-paternalistic” system focused on
correcting cognitive errors.163 Such a suggestion also builds on general
proposals for “asymmetric paternalism,” in that greater information would not
hurt those taxpayers who are already aware of the limits of the charitable
deduction, but it would likely greatly change the knowledge level of those who
were not aware of such limits.164
One of the lessons from behavioral economics is that significant changes in
behavior may be achieved through a simple reframing of a situation.165 One
form of government action to curtail hypersalience could be as simple as
requiring private third-party beneficiaries to couch all references to the
availability of tax benefits with words such as “may,” “might,” or “possibly,”
or to follow the lead of some organizations and encourage taxpayers to consult
with their tax advisors. In the context of the charitable deduction, third-party

charitable entities).
161 For more on the constitutionality of disclosure requirements, see Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339-40 (2010)
162 See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104-07 (providing guidelines for charities that
solicit dual-purpose contributions, including a requirement that marketing materials and any
receipts must include the amount of the donation that is not deductible); Rev. Proc. 90-12,
1990-1 C.B. 471-73 (providing extra guidelines).
163 McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1935.
164 For more on asymmetric paternalism, see generally Camerer, supra note 15. There,
the authors define asymmetric paternalism as “creat[ing] large benefits for those who make
errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.” Id. at 1212.
165 Id. at 1230 ( “[R]e-framing a situation in subtle ways that would be irrelevant from
the perspective of the standard economic model can have large effects on behavior.”).
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marketing materials could also be required to refer explicitly to the fact that
only a minority of taxpayers will itemize their deductions. Such a change
would be unlikely to change the perception of taxpayers who are already fully
aware of the limits of the deduction, but it may prevent at least some others
who currently act on misinformation.166
While such a limit is unlikely to eliminate hypersalience completely, it
responds to the cognitive distortions underlying hypersalience both by taking
advantage of the insights of behavioral economics and by relying on the parties
whose actions have contributed to hypersalience. Given that this limit would
have to be structured to avoid constitutional concerns and that it would also
create monitoring costs for the government, this proposal may not be ideal. It
is, however, the least problematic first step toward curtailing hypersalience in
revenue-reducing tax provisions. And while this proposal has focused
primarily on the limits that could be imposed on charitable organizations, the
concept of requiring third-party beneficiaries to advertise the restrictions as
well as the benefits could likely be extended to other hypersalient tax
provisions as well.
CONCLUSION
Until now, discussions of salience in the context of the tax system have
focused primarily on the distinction between hidden taxes and more salient
taxes. Taking the charitable deduction as its primary example, this Article
argues that some tax provisions are in fact more than fully salient – their
benefits are extremely prominent, while the limits that restrict the availability
of these benefits are themselves hidden. This combination of a highly salient
tax provision and that provision’s hidden limits is hypersalience. While this
Article does not provide empirical evidence of the incidence of hypersalience,
its primary contribution to the literature is to introduce the concept of
hypersalience and its implications. By illustrating this term by way of the
charitable deduction and highlighting the ramifications of hypersalience, this
Article both invites further research and complicates the current literature on
tax policy and behavioral economics.
The concept of hypersalience suggests that some tax provisions may be
more treasury efficient than previously expected and that certain tax
expenditures may thus provide less expensive means for achieving some policy
goals than direct spending. Although some readers may see this concept as a
new tool in the efforts to achieve desirable policy goals while reducing revenue
loss, this Article concludes that the costs of hypersalience outweigh its benefits
due to its reliance on taxpayer illiteracy and misinformation. Although this
166 But see Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the LifeCycle with Implications for Regulation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2009,
at 27 (expressing skepticism at the value of disclosure and stating that “[e]ven for
cognitively healthy populations, there is scant evidence that increases in disclosure improve
decision-making”).
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Article concludes with potential responses to hypersalience, its main goal is to
introduce the concept of hypersalience and to illustrate how this phenomenon
brings new complications and complexities to discussions of salience, tax
expenditures, and taxation as a whole.

